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by 
XIE Lingmin 
Master of Philosophy 
The adverse selection and agency cost theories suggest that the informational 
transparency of a firm can help to reduce over- or under-investment. This thesis 
examines how information asymmetry influences firm-level investment efficiency for 
companies listed in the U.S. market from 1993 to 2009. Information asymmetry is 
measured by the dispersion and error of the earnings forecasts made by financial 
analysts. I investigate how information asymmetry affects firms’ proneness to over- 
or under-invest and the firms’ deviations from the investment levels predicted by 
investment opportunities. To be consistent with the prior literature, I also use the 
volatility of daily stock returns and yearly high-low price spreads derived from daily 
stock trading as alternative proxies of information asymmetry.  
The results show that lower information asymmetry is associated with more efficient 
investment. Specifically, a good information environment reduces capital investment 
for firms that are more prone to over-invest and increases capital investment for those 
that are more prone to under-invest. In addition, lower information asymmetry is also 
negatively associated with firm investment when the firm is over-investing and is 
positively associated with firm investment when the firm is under-investing The 
results are robust across different regression methodologies and to different estimates 
of the variables. My findings are consistent with the agency theories of adverse 
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How Does Asymmetric Information Relate to Investment Efficiency? 
Evidence from Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Daily Stock 
Trading 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis examines firms’ investment decisions in the presence of asymmetric 
information. In theory, without any frictions, firms invest efficiently by undertaking 
projects with positive net present values (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, 
prior literature suggests that the existence of asymmetric information can reduce 
investment efficiency for at least two reasons. First, the deviation from efficient 
investment is a result of the principal-agent conflict, where managers work for their 
own interests through making non-optimal investment decisions when their interests 
are misaligned with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
asymmetric information available to the agent and the managers limits the 
shareholders’ abilities to monitor the managers and thus increases the possibility of 
over- and under-investment. Second, the investment inefficiency is a consequence of 
the imperfection of capital markets where firm insiders and external suppliers of 
capital possess asymmetric sets of information. When raising capital is difficult and 
costly, firms have to give up profitable projects and suffer under-investment (Myers, 
1984). Alternatively, the “lemons problem” of selling overpriced securities gives rise 
to over-investment (Baker et al., 2003).  
 
This thesis focuses on whether a better information environment (or lower 
information asymmetry) is associated with a reduction of firm-level over-investment 
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and a reduction of under-investment. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the 
first to examine the influence of information asymmetry on investment efficiency 
directly. Prior research such as Biddle et al. (2009) and Verdi (2006) documents that 
higher quality financial reporting improves investment efficiency by reducing over- 
and under-investment through mitigating information asymmetry between firms and 
external suppliers of capital. In a related study, García Lara et al. (2010) further 
document that firms which are more conservative in preparing accounting reports are 
able to ameliorate information asymmetry problems, and are thus less likely to over- 
or under-invest. Focusing only on the over-investment behaviors of firms, Richardson 
(2006) finds that firms with the highest levels of free cash flow tend to over-invest. 
He argues that information asymmetry makes it costly for investors to monitor 
management. Under this situation, managers engage in additional investment on self-
serving projects rather than distribute the cash to shareholders. My thesis extends 
these findings by showing, in a more direct manner, how information asymmetry 
influences firm-level investments. 
  
A major strand of the investment literature has examined how various factors, 
including asymmetric information, affect investment-cash flow sensitivities, where 
the sensitivities of investment to cash flows indicate the reliance of investment on 
internal funds and/or the reluctance of managers to return excess cash to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). It has been shown that higher financial reporting quality reduces 
investment-cash flow sensitivities (Biddle and Hilary, 2006) and that information 
asymmetry in the form of higher bid-ask spreads (lower market liquidity) and the 
probability of informed trading exacerbates investment-cash flow sensitivities 
(Ascioglu et al., 2008). However, as the internally generated cash flow could be 
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invested in profitable projects, high investment-cash flow sensitivity may not always 
indicate investment inefficiency (over- or under-investment). Therefore, the 
conclusions from the prior literature about the factors influencing investment-cash 
flow sensitivity cannot be automatically extended to investigations of investment 
efficiency.   
 
Following Biddle et al. (2009), my empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, I 
examine whether lower information asymmetry reduces investments for firms that are 
more prone to over-invest and increases investments for those that are more prone to 
under-invest. The firms’ proneness to over- and under-invest is measured through 
ranking the firms according to their leverage and cash, as suggested by Myers (1977) 
and Jensen (1986). Second, I classify firms as over-investing or under-investing based 
on their deviations from the optimal investment levels predicted by investment 
opportunities and explore the effects of lower information asymmetry on investments 
for over- and under-investing firms, separately.  
 
My study captures asymmetric information by using the error and dispersion of the 
earnings forecasts made by financial analysts. These measures convey the accuracy of 
earnings forecasts and the disagreements among financial analysts, and are expected 
to be higher if the firm being analyzed has greater insider information and is less 
transparent. In addition, the information asymmetry estimated in this way is not 
limited to the information conveyed by historical accounting statements. I also 
consider two alternative proxies of information asymmetry constructed from the daily 
stock trading process, namely the volatility of daily stock returns and the yearly high-
low stock price spread, which capture the information asymmetry among investors 
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who trade in the stock market (Dierkens, 1991; Linck et al., 2008; Corwin and 
Schultz, 2012).  
 
I test my hypotheses using a panel data set of U.S. publicly listed non-financial and 
non-regulated firms from 1993 to 2009 and find results consistent with the adverse 
selection explanation and principal-agent conflict argument. First, lower information 
asymmetry is shown to be negatively associated with investment if the firms have the 
potential to over- invest (i.e., firms with relatively more cash and lower leverage) and 
is positively associated with investment if the firms are inclined to under-invest (i.e., 
firms with relatively less cash and higher leverage). This finding suggests that among 
the firms that are more likely to over- or under-invest, lower asymmetric information, 
as measured by analysts’ forecast error and dispersion and the volatility of daily stock 
returns and the yearly high-low stock price spread, suppresses firms’ incentives to 
make non-optimal investment decisions and improves firm-level investment 
efficiency. Second, my results show that a better information environment or lower 
information asymmetry improves firms’ investment efficiency by reducing the 
deviations from the optimal investment levels as predicted by investment 
opportunities. More specifically, a better information environment is able to reduce 
investments when the firm is already over-investing and to increase investments when 
the firm is already under-investing. 
 
A plausible explanation for my results is that both the asymmetric information and 
investment efficiency of a firm are endogenously determined by some unobservable 
firm-specific factors. To address this concern, I use fixed firm and year effects 
regressions. To be consistent with the prior literature, I control for financial reporting 
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quality throughout my analysis, which will also rule out the possibility that analysts' 
forecast accuracy and uncertainty are solely proxies of financial reporting quality or 
the possibility that analysts depend only on information conveyed in financial 
statements when they make earnings forecasts. The robustness tests, including the 
two-stage instrumental variables regressions, all generate consistent results.  
  
My thesis contributes to several strands of the existing literature. The first 
contribution is that I directly show how information asymmetry affects the firm-level 
investment efficiency of U.S. publicly listed non-financial and non-regulated firms. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to show direct evidence on this 
relation. Prior studies show that some factors such as financial reporting quality 
increase firms’ investment efficiency by reducing the firms’ information asymmetry 
or that information asymmetry increases firms’ investment-cash flow sensitivities. 
However, no previous study has directly investigated the association between 
information asymmetry and investment efficiency. My study also indicates that when 
analysts make earnings forecasts and when investors participate in the market, they 
take not only the information conveyed in financial statements but also other 
information into consideration, because my proxies of information asymmetry still 
have a significant effect on investment efficiency after controlling for accounting 
quality. 
 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief literature 
review as well as developing my hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the sample and 
variables. Chapter 4 introduces the research design and model specifications. Chapter 
5 presents empirical results and Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2．Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Literature review 
In a complete market without frictions, firms invest efficiently by undertaking 
projects with positive net present values (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). In the real 
world, information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside capital providers 
and between managers and shareholders creates conditions whereby managers can 
make investment decisions that deviate from the optimal levels, and thus lead to over-
investment or under-investment. Insiders possess superior information about the true 
economic values of their firms when compared to “outsiders” and they have 
incentives to sell overpriced securities, which brings in excess capital that enables 
over-investment. However, rational investors and lenders may detect or suspect such 
behavior and respond by rationing capital, which will increase the cost of external 
finance and reduce the ability of the firm to finance feasible investments.  
 
Akerlof (1970) pioneered the adverse selection literature (also referred to as the 
“lemons problem”), showing the impact of information asymmetry on investment 
decisions through influencing equity financing. In a perfect capital market, there is no 
cost differential between internal and external funds. When firms and potential 
investors or lenders have different information (i.e., information asymmetry) about 
the firms' prospects, market imperfections arise. Firms’ internal and external finance 
are not perfect substitutes anymore under these circumstances, and external financing 
becomes more costly or even completely unavailable when information asymmetry is 
very high. The model developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that the impact 
of information asymmetry will be to increase the cost of capital of firms forced to 
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raise external finance, which in turn will lead to a higher reliance of investment on 
internally generated funds and/or induce under-investment. 
 
Recent empirical studies have shown that higher information asymmetry is associated 
with higher costs of equity capital (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Francis et al., 
2005). Managers, who have superior information and represent the interests of 
existing shareholders, will prefer to forego projects with positive net present values 
rather than sell under-valued securities to finance the investment. Similar arguments 
also apply to debt financing where lenders with less information than borrowers tend 
to maximize their profits by charging higher interest rates on loans, which will drive 
away “good borrowers” (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Fazzari et al., 1988). As stated in 
Fazzari et al. (1988), borrowers have private information about the riskiness of their 
project returns, while lenders cannot easily distinguish "good borrowers" from "bad 
borrowers". Under these circumstances, the higher loan interest rates imposed by 
banks and bondholders will drive away borrowers with good projects. 
  
Besides adverse selection problems, the principal-agent conflict or moral hazard 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) attributes distortions in investment to the misalignment 
of managerial incentives and shareholder interests and argues that managers over-
invest to reap private benefits from, for example, empire building (Jensen, 1986) and 
managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Moreover, managers have 
other private objectives that might lead them to inefficiently invest shareholders’ 
capital. For example, managers might pursue perquisite consumptions (Jensen, 1986), 
and retain cash windfalls inside the firm and invest them in unattractive projects for 
the purposes of self-gratification or maintaining the long-run survival and the 
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independence of their firms with themselves at the helm (Blanchard et al., 1994). 
Managers might also have career concerns caused by the incongruity in risk 
preferences between the managers and the firms’ shareholders (Holmstrom, 1999), a 
preference for a “quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), and hubris, where 
managers overestimate their abilities to identify good investments (Heaton, 2002). 
These behavioral traits can induce over- or under-investment. Agency problems can 
also affect investment efficiency through increasing the cost of capital. If investors 
are not convinced that managers can credibly commit to foregoing expropriation, they 
will put a low valuation on the firm and its cost of capital will be high (Grossman and 
Hart, 1982; Young et al., 2008). However, a timely and transparent information 
environment helps shareholders to monitor managements and prevents managers 
from making investment decisions that deviate from the optimal levels.  
 
Prior literature has investigated how information asymmetry influences investment-
cash flow sensitivities. Fazzari et al. (1988) first document that imperfect information 
can create "financing hierarchies" over the use of internal and external funds, and 
make firms’ investment expenditures more sensitive to internal cash flows and stock 
liquidity. Using a set of firms in the Standard and Poor’s 1500 (S&P 1500) index in 
year 2000 and 2003, Ascioglu et al. (2008) use market microstructure measures of 
liquidity from stock market high-frequency trading and find that higher informational 
frictions are associated with lower average firm-level investments and higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivities. Using data from 34 countries, Biddle and Hilary 
(2006) show that the quality of accounting reports is negatively related with 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and higher accounting quality reduces investment-
cash flow sensitivity more in economies dominated by stock markets than in those 
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dominated by creditors. The investment-cash flow sensitivity measures the degree of 
the reliance of firms’ investments on internally generated cash, which as pointed by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Fazzari et al. (2000) can reflect external 
financing constraints and/or an excess of cash, but cannot capture investment 
(in)efficiency, i.e., over-investment and under-investment.
1
 Thus, the results and 
conclusions from previous studies that examine the factors influencing investment-
cash flow sensitivity cannot be automatically imputed to investigations of investment 
efficiency. 
 
Previous literature about investment efficiency is limited. Motivated by the principal-
agent conflict or agency cost explanations, Richardson (2006) documents that over-
investment is concentrated in firms with the highest level of free cash flow. He argues 
that the monitoring difficulty resulting from information asymmetry creates the 
potential for managers in firms with free cash flow to engage in projects that are 
beneficial to management but costly from a shareholder perspective. Biddle et al. 
(2009) study the effects of financial reporting quality on their measures of over- and 
under-investment, separately, based on a large sample of firms in the U.S. from 1993 
to 2005. They find evidence that there is a negative (positive) association between 
financial reporting quality and investment for firms operating in settings more prone 
to over-investment (under-investment) and firms with higher financial reporting 
quality deviate less from their predicted investment levels and show less sensitivity to 
macro-economic conditions. They argue that one possible mechanism linking 
reporting quality and investment efficiency is that financial reporting quality serves a 
role in mitigating information frictions that ultimately hamper investment efficiency. 
                                                          
1
 Alti (2003) shows that investment-cash flow sensitivity is substantially higher for young and small 
firms with high growth rates and low dividend payout ratios. 
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Similarly, using a large U.S. sample from the period 1990-2007 and following the 
method of Biddle et al. (2009), García Lara et al. (2010) analyze the association 
between investment efficiency and a proxy of firm-level conservative reporting. They 
find a strong negative relation between a firm specific measure of conservatism and 
measures of over- and under-investment and attribute this to the informational 
benefits of conservatism, which is predicted to reduce information asymmetry and 
thus ameliorate both moral hazard and principal-agent conflict. The evidence from 
these studies suggests that accounting quality and accounting conservatism have an 
effect on information asymmetry which in turn influences firm-level investment 
efficiency. In my study, I directly investigate how information asymmetry influences 
firms’ investment efficiency, or how a better information environment helps reduce 
over- or under-investment.  
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Since asymmetric information distorts firm-level investment efficiency, a better 
information environment is expected to restrain managers from inflating firm 
performance in the market and from making over- and under-investment decisions. 
Here, the argument is that if more information is disclosed to the public, especially 
when potential projects with positive net present values are more visible, it will ease 
the capital-raising process of firms and reduce related costs and, in turn, the set of 
projects with positive net present values available for investment will be enlarged. 
Meanwhile, lower asymmetric information or higher transparency can limit 
managerial control rights and enhance the shareholders’ ability to monitor managerial 
investment decisions. Alternatively, managers may be aware of the monitoring and 
constraints they face and build up and maintain self-discipline. Consequently, 
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managers refrain from attempting to expropriate firm cash flows from shareholders 
through engaging in value-destroying investments.  
 
Based on the above discussions, I hypothesize that lower information asymmetry will 
improve firm-level investment efficiency by reducing firms’ over-investment, under-
investment or both. More specifically, I form the following two hypotheses: 
H1a: lower information asymmetry is associated with higher investment for under-
investing firms and the firms that are more likely to under-invest. 
H1b: lower information asymmetry is associated with lower investment for over-


















Chapter 3. Data description 
3.1 Sample construction 
I obtain earnings forecasts and actual earnings from the Unadjusted Detail History file 
and Unadjusted Detail Actuals file of the Institutional Brokers Estimate Systems 
(I/B/E/S), respectively
2
. Annual financial data on firms and historical stock trading 
data are respectively obtained from Compustat and Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP).  
 
As the number of analysts following any given firm in the U.S. market tends to 
increase as the fiscal year end approaches and decrease after the eleventh month, I 
follow O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) and Mansi et al. (2011) and use the forecasts 
made in the one month prior to the fiscal year-end to calculate forecast dispersion and 
error. For example, I use the forecasts released by financial analysts during November 
if a company’s fiscal year-end is December 31. Including the forecasts made near the 
end of the fiscal year can reduce the effects of optimism bias that appears to exist in 
the forecasts released at the beginning of the fiscal year (e.g., Fried and Givoly, 1982; 
O’Brien, 1988; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). Moreover, limiting the selection period 
to one month to shorten the length of the window is advantageous because the past 
literature has shown that when all forecasts are not equally recent, analysts who make 
forecasts later have an information advantage over the earlier predictions released by 
other analysts (e.g., O’Brien, 1990; Loh and Mian, 2006). For the above reasons, 
                                                          
2
 I/B/E/S adjusts forecasts and actual data for stock splits and rounds them to two decimals in the 
summary file and four decimals in the detail file. This rounding artificially reduces forecast dispersion 
and error, introducing measurement error (e.g., Payne and Thomas, 2003). To avoid this problem, I 
conduct my analyses on the basis of raw forecast data unadjusted for stock splits and re-adjust them 
following the instruction provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
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forecasts released near to the end of the forecasting period are more appropriate for 
constructing proxies of information asymmetry for individual firms. 
 
To be included in the sample, firm-year observations need to have at least two 
analysts providing earnings forecasts. Firms in the financial industry (SIC codes 
6000-6999) are excluded because their financial ratios are not comparable to those of 
the firms in other industry sectors. Firms in the utilities industry (SIC codes 4900-
4999) are also excluded because they tend to have different objectives from other 
firms when making investment decisions due to heavy regulations, and are subject to 
various investment constraints. In order to mitigate the influence of outliers in each 
year, I remove the top and bottom 1% of all continuous variables by year. My final 
sample contains 12,871 firm-year observations from 1993 to 2009. 
3.2 Variable definitions 
In my study, information asymmetry is first measured by the dispersion and error of 
the earnings forecasts made by financial analysts. Forecast dispersion (Disp) is 
defined as the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by the stock 
price at fiscal year-end and then multiplied by minus one. Forecast error (Error) is 
defined as the absolute earnings forecast error: |actual-median forecast|, scaled by the 
stock price at the fiscal year-end and then multiplied by minus one. I use negative 
dispersion and error so that Disp and Error are increasing with information quality 
and decreasing with the information asymmetry of firms.  
 
Analysts are prominent information intermediaries in capital markets. They engage in 
information search from public and private sources. The forecast dispersion and error 
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are considered to be straightforward, forward-looking and comprehensive
3
 as 
measures of information asymmetry, and have been widely used in the prior literature 
(e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Thomas, 
2002). Forecast dispersion represents the disagreements among analysts about the 
future performance of firms. High dispersion implies low consensus among analysts’ 
forecasts, and is a sign of low transparency of a firm. The error in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts is a particularly appropriate proxy of the level of information asymmetry 
about a firm given the evidence shown in Elton et al. (1984). Firms with higher levels 
of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and between managers and 
shareholders are expected to have higher forecast dispersion and error. 
 
In addition to forecast dispersion and error, I also use two alternative proxies of 
information asymmetry measured by the volatility of daily stock returns and yearly 
high-low stock price spread. The first measure is the volatility of daily stock returns 
or market-adjusted residual volatility of the daily stock returns, which I denote as Std
4
. 
The second is the yearly high-low price spreads based on daily high-low stock price 
data from CRSP following the methodology in Corwin and Schultz (2012), which I 
denote as Spread. Higher volatility in stock returns and stock price spread indicates 
more uncertainties in the market and higher information asymmetry among investors. 
These variables have been used in prior studies to measure information asymmetry 
(Dierkens, 1991; Linck et al., 2008; Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011; Cho et al., 2013). 
                                                          
3
 Ohlson (2001) and Bryan and Tiras (2007) both document that analysts’ earnings forecasts not 
only reflect the information conveyed by accounting fundamentals but also capture other 
information about future earnings. 
4
 Each year, I regress a firm’s daily stock returns on market daily returns and obtain its residuals. 
Std is measured as the standard deviation of the residuals. 
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Both measures are multiplied by minus one so that they are increasing with 
information quality and decreasing with information asymmetry.  
 
Following Biddle et al. (2009), a firm’s investment, denoted by Invest, is measured as 
the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and 
acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from the sale of property, plant, and 
equipment and scaled by lagged total assets. In robustness tests, I also use capital 
investment, Capex, as the dependent variable and the results are consistent with those 
from the more comprehensive measure of investment described above (Invest). 
 
Consistent with prior literature, I control for cash balance (Jensen, 1986) denoted by 
Cash and financial leverage (Myers, 1977) denoted by Leverage, which are important 
indicators of a firm’s financial condition. I also control for other firm-specific 
characteristics including firm age (Age), the difference between the date when a firm 
first appeared in CRSP and fiscal year end date, firm size (Size), calculated as the 
logarithm of total assets, and market-to-book ratio (MB), which is the ratio of the 
market value of equity to the book value of common stock. I also include Sdcfo, 
Sdsales, and Sdinvest, which are, respectively, the standard deviation of cash flow 
from operations deflated by average total assets, the standard deviation of sales 
deflated by average total assets, and the standard deviation of investment (Invest) 
measured over the years t-5 to t-1. Loss is an indicator variable that is coded one if net 
income before extraordinary items is negative and zero otherwise. Dividend is an 
indicator variable that is coded one if the firm paid a dividend and zero otherwise. 
Zscore measures the degree of a firm’s financial health; the higher the probability of 
corporate default, the lower the score. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total 
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assets. Operating cycle (OC) is defined as the average time between purchasing or 
acquiring inventory and receiving the cash proceeds from sales.  
 
Following Biddle et al. (2009), I also control for financial reporting quality (AQ), 
which measures the precision of the information conveyed in financial reports about 
the firm’s operation, in particular its expected cash flow. Financial reporting quality is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from a regression 
model developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and extended by Francis et al. (2005) 
to include change in revenues and plant, property and equipment (PPE) from years t-5 
to t-1 and multiplied by negative one so that AQ is increasing in financial reporting 
quality. The extended model regresses working capital accruals on lagged, current 
and future cash flows plus the change in revenue (scaled by average total assets) and 
PPE
5
. The model is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 
observations in a given year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classifications. The measure is based on the idea that accruals are estimates of future 
cash flows and will be more predictive of future cash flows when there is lower 
estimation error embedded in the accruals process. The residuals from the model 
represent the estimation errors in the current accruals that are not associated with 
operating cash flows and that cannot be explained by the change in revenue and the 
level of PPE. So the unexplained portion of the variation in working capital accruals 
                                                          
5
 The extended model is TCAi,t = α0 + α1CFOi,t-1 + α2CFOi,t + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4 △Revi,t + α5PPEi,t + εi,t,, 
where TCAj,t = total current accruals in year t= △CAj,t – △CLj,t – △Cashj,t + STDEBTj,t, CFOj,t = NIBEj,t 
– TAj,t = firm i’s cash flow from operations in year t, NIBEj,t = firm i’s net income before extraordinary 
items (item18) in year t, TAj,t = firm i’s total accruals in year t = (△CAj,t – △CLj,t – △Cashj,t + 
△STDEBTj,t – DEPNj,t), △CAj,t = firm i’s change in current assets (item 4) between year t-1 and year t, 
△CLj,t = firm i’s change in current liabilities (item 5) between year t-1 and year t, △Cashj,t = firm i’s 
change in cash (item 1) between year t-1 and year t, △STDEBTj,t = firm i’s change in debt in current 
liabilities (item 34) between year t-1 and year t, DEPNj,t = firm i’s depreciation and amortization 
expense (item 14) in year t, △Revi,t= firm i’s change in revenue (item 12) between year t-1 and year t 
and PPEi,t= firm i’s gross value of PPE (item 7).  
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is an inverse measure of accruals quality, or the reporting quality (Biddle et al., 2009; 
Chen et al., 2011). The detailed descriptions and definitions of variables are given in 
Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample including mean, standard 
deviation (STD), 25% percentile, median, and 75% percentile. The mean (median) of 
investments across all firm-years is 16.1% (11.0%) of the prior years’ total assets. 
The mean (median) value of reporting quality (AQ) is -0.105 (-0.059), which is 
consistent with those reported in Biddle et al. (2009) and Garcia Lara et al. (2010). 
The forecast dispersion (Disp) has a mean of -0.006 and a median of -0.002 and the 
forecast error (Error) has a mean of -0.011 and a median of -0.002 (note that the 
dispersion and error have been multiplied by minus one). The mean (median) of the 
volatility of daily stock returns (Std) is -0.028 (-0.025) and the mean (median) of 
yearly high-low price spreads (Spread) is -0.004 (-0.002) (note that Std and Spread 
have been multiplied by minus one and increase with information quality).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix of the variables used in my analysis. 
Forecast dispersion and error are positively and significantly correlated with 
investments at time t+1, with coefficients of 0.04 and 0.04, respectively. However, as 
I will show later, the relation between information asymmetry and investment is 
conditional on the firm’s proneness to over- or under-invest or on whether the firm 
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positively or negatively deviates from the predicted investment level. Consistent with 
the prior literature, the quality of financial reporting is significantly and positively 
related to each of the proxies of information asymmetry and the four proxies of 
information asymmetry are also significantly and positively correlated with each 
other. In addition, cash and leverage are significantly correlated with investments 
with their predicted positive and negative signs, respectively. Firms with more cash in 
hand are more likely to over-invest and those with higher leverage are more likely to 
have financial constraints and tend to under-invest. The correlation coefficients 
between the other control variables and investments are broadly consistent with those 
in Biddle et al. (2009). 









Chapter 4. Research methodology and model specifications 
4.1 Measuring over- and under-investment 
As discussed earlier, the relation between lower asymmetric information and 
investment is expected to be either negative for over-investing firms or positive for 
under-investing firms. So my estimation starts from measuring over- and under-
investment. Following Biddle et al. (2009), I use two approaches, which are the 
firms’ proneness to over- and under-invest and the firms’ actual deviations from the 
investment levels predicted from their investment opportunities and industry 
affiliations.   
 
To measure the firms’ proneness to over- and under-invest, in each year and industry, 
firms are ranked into deciles based on each of the two firm-specific variables, cash 
balance and leverage (I multiply leverage by minus one before ranking so that it is 
increasing with the likelihood of over-investment). The two groups of ranked 
numbers are rescaled to range between zero and one, respectively. Firms with more 
cash in hand are subject to higher agency costs and have a greater potential to over-
invest (Jensen, 1986). In contrast, the lack of cash and/or high leverage may lead to 
financial constraints and thus result in under-investment. Therefore, the likelihood of 
over-investment increases with cash and decreases with leverage, while that of under-
investment decreases with cash and increases with leverage. My rankings according 
to cash and minus leverage give the highest rank to the firms that are most likely to 
over-invest and the lowest rank to the firms that are most likely to under-invest. I then 
construct a variable, OverInvest, as the average of the two rescaled ranks. If 
OverInvest is one or close to one then I describe the firm as being prone to over-
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invest while if OverInvest is zero or close to zero, I describe the firm as being prone 
to under-invest. OverInvest increases with the firm’s likelihood of over-investment. 
As shown in Table 2, the mean and standard deviation of OverInvest are, respectively, 
0.495 and 0.232. 
  
My first approach considers over- and under-investment conditional on the firms’ 
cash and leverage. The second approach directly measures the deviations from the 
predicted level of investments, based on a regression model of investment as a 
function of investment opportunities, measured by Tobin’s Q6, specified as follows: 
 Investi,t+1 = α +βQi,t+1  + εi,t+1               eq. (1), 
where Investi,t+1 refers to the total investment of firm i at year t+1, and Qi,t refers to 
the Tobin’s Q in year t. The regression model of eq. (1) is estimated cross-sectionally 
for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama and 
French (1997) 48-industry classifications. The resulting regression residuals are used 
as the firm-specific proxies of the deviations from expected investment levels. Firms 
with negative residuals are classified as under-investing and those with positive 
residuals are classified as over-investing. I define a dummy variable, neg, which is 
coded 1 if a firm is classified as under-investing (with a negative residual) and 
otherwise coded zero, and a dummy variable, pos, which is coded 1 if a firm is 
classified as over-investing (with a positive residual) and otherwise coded zero
7
.  
                                                          
6
 In untabulated analysis, I find that results are similar if I estimate the model using sales growth, 
which is the change in sales from year t-1 to t, as a proxy of investment opportunities. 
7
As a further test, I drop the observations if the residual is lower than the median of the positive 
residuals and is higher than the median of the negative residuals. For the remaining observations, if the 
residual is positive, the dummy variable, pos, is coded one and otherwise coded zero. Similarly, the 
dummy variable, neg, is coded one for the observations with negative residuals and otherwise coded 
zero. The results for this test are reported later in Table 8. 
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4.2 Regression models 
In order to test whether lower information asymmetry is positively (negatively) 
associated with investment among the firms that are more prone to under-invest 
(over-invest), I include the ranked variable, OverInvest, discussed in the previous 
section and the fixed firm and year effect regression model is specified as follows: 
Investi,t+1 = α0 + α1Dispi,t + α2Dispi,t× OverInvesti,t + α3OverInvesti,t  
+ α4AQi,t + α5AQi,t× OverInvesti,t + γControli,t +λi+ εi,t+1         eq.(2), 
where Investi,t+1 refers to the investment of firm i in year t+1, Dispi,t refers to the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts of firm i in year t multiplied by minus one and AQi,t 
represents the accounting quality. The proneness to over- and under-invest for firm i 
in year t is captured by the ranked variable, OverInvesti,t, which ranges from zero to 
one and takes the value of zero (one) or close to zero (one) for firms that are more 
prone to under-invest (over-invest).  
  
In eq. (2), when OverInvest equals zero, the coefficient on Dispi,t, α1, measures the 
effect of asymmetric information on investment among the firms with the highest 
level of leverage and lowest amount of cash (i.e., firms in the bottom decile). 
According to H1a, lower information asymmetry increases the investments for the 
firms that are most likely to under-invest. So, I expect that α1>0. The effect of 
information asymmetry on investments among the firms that are more prone to over-
invest (i.e., firms with the highest amount of cash and lowest level of leverage) is 
captured by the sum of the coefficients on Dispi,t and the interaction term of 
Dispi,t× OverInvesti,t, which is α1+α2. According to H1b, I expect that the effect is 
negative and α1+α2 <0. The coefficient on the interaction term, α2, measures the 
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incremental relation between information asymmetry and investment among the firms 
that are most likely to over-invest, and according to H1a and H1b, I expect that α2 <0.  
 
Based on the deviation from the predicted investment level, I further test the effects 
of information asymmetry on firm-level under- and over-investment using a 
regression model as follows:  
Investi,t+1 = β0 + β1Dispi,t× negi,t+1 + β2Dispi,t× posi,t+1+ ηControli,t +λi +εi,t+1  eq.(3), 
where the investment of firm i in year t+1, Investi,t+1, is explained by the interaction 
term of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts at year t and the under-investment dummy at 
year t+1, Dispi,t× negi,t+1, the interaction term of dispersion of analysts’ forecasts at 
year t and the over-investment dummy at year t+1, Dispi,t× posi,t+1, and control 
variables. The dummy variables neg and pos are defined based on the regression 
model of eq. (1) and discussed in the previous section. 
 
According to my hypothesis H1a, if the firm appears to under-invest, lower 
asymmetric information is expected to increase investment. Hence, I expect that the 
coefficient on Dispi,t× negi,t+1 in eq.(3), β1, to be positive. In contrast, if the firm is 
over-investing compared with the predicted level, lower asymmetric information is 
expected to reduce investment and thus the coefficient on Dispi,t× posi,t+1 in eq.(3), β2, 
is expected to be negative.  
 
For both the regression models specified in eq.(2) and eq.(3), alternative proxies of 
asymmetric information are used by replacing Dispi,t by Errori,t, Stdi,t and Spreadi,t. 
To control for the potential endogeneity problem due to omitted firm-specific 
variables that influence both asymmetric information and investment efficiency, I use 
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the fixed firm and year effect regression model for both eq.(2) and eq.(3) to eliminate 
the time-invariant firm effect.
8
 Control variables following the prior literature are also 
included. Following Biddle et al. (2009), I also use a regression model with fixed-
industry effect and with standard errors clustered in the two dimensions of firm and 
year for eq.(2) (proposed by Petersen, 2009). The results are overall consistent with 


















                                                          
8
 Results from the Hausman Test suggest that it is more appropriate to use fixed-effect models in my 
tests than random effect models. 
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Chapter 5. Empirical results 
5.1 Firms that are more prone to over- or under-invest 
In this section, I test how asymmetric information affects investments among the 
firms that are more prone to over- or under-invest, where the proneness is captured by 
the ranked variable, OverInvest, which is described in Section 4.1. Table 4 reports the 
fixed-effect regression results of eq. (2). In column (1), when Disp is used as a proxy 
of asymmetric information, the estimated coefficient on Disp is positive (1.684) and 
significant (p=0.000). Therefore, among the firms that are more prone to under-invest, 
lower asymmetric information increases investments. In terms of the economic 
significance, when Disp increases by one standard deviation, investment of the under-
investing firms will increase by 0.032
9
. Given that the mean investment of the whole 




The estimated coefficient on the interaction term of Disp× OverInvest is significantly 
negative (-2.935, p=0.000). The overall effect of lower asymmetric information on 
investments among the firms that are more prone to over-invest is captured by the 
sum of coefficient estimates on Disp and Disp× OverInvest, i.e., α1+α2 in eq.(2), 
which is significantly negative according to the joint test (–1.250, p=0.000). In terms 
of the economic significance, increasing Disp by one standard deviation decreases 
investment by 0.024
11
 among the firms that are most likely to over-invest and it 
represents a decrease in investment of about 14.9%
12
 (The mean investment of the 
whole sample is 0.161). 
                                                          
9
 This figure is calculated as 1.684×0.019. 
10
 This figure is calculated as 0.032/0.161. 
11
 This figure is calculated as 1.250×0.019.  
12
 This figure is calculated as 0.024/0.161. 
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My regression analysis controls for accounting quality, AQ, estimated following the 
method of Biddle et al. (2009) and Dechow and Dichev (2002). Consistent with the 
prior literature, the accounting quality increases investments for firms that are more 
likely to under-invest (0.336, p=0.000) and decreases investments for firms that are 
more likely to over-invest (-0.425, p=0.000). The results for the other control 
variables are also consistent with those reported in previous studies (e.g., Biddle et al., 
2009). 
 
In column (2), when replacing the measure of asymmetric information by Error, the 
estimated coefficients on the experimental variables, Error, Error× OverInvest, and 
OverInvest, also have the predicted signs and are statistically significant. Specifically, 
the estimated coefficient on Error is positive (0.254) and significant (p=0.000) and 
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term of Error× OverInvest is significantly 
negative (-0.465, p=0.009). The overall effect of lower asymmetric information on 
investments among the firms that are more prone to over-invest is captured by the 
sum of coefficient estimates on Error and Error× OverInvest, i.e., α1+α2 in eq.(2), 
which is significantly negative according to the joint test (-0.211, p=0.075). In terms 
of the economic significance, when Error increases by one standard deviation, 
investment of the under-investing firms will increase by 0.013
13
. Given that the mean 
investment of the whole sample is 0.161, the effect represents an increase in 
investment of 8.1%. In addition, increasing Error by one standard deviation decreases 
investment by 0.011
14
 among the firms that are most likely to over-invest and it 
represents a decrease in investment of about 6.8%. The effects of information 
                                                          
13
 This figure is calculated as 0.254×0.053. 
14
 This figure is calculated as 0.211×0.053.  
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asymmetry on investment efficiency are economically and statistically significant 
when forecast dispersion and error are used as the proxies of information asymmetry. 
 
I also use two alternative measures as the proxies of asymmetric information that 
have appeared in the literature. They are the volatility of daily stock returns (Std) and 
yearly high-low price spreads (Spread) derived from daily stock trading. As 
mentioned previously, both variables are multiplied by minus one so that Std and 
Spread are increasing with information quality. The regression results are presented 
in columns (3) and (4) in Table 4. The results are consistent with those in columns (1) 
and (2). In particular, the coefficients on the information asymmetry variables, 
OverInvest, interactions, and the joint tests have their expected signs and are 
statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Following Biddle et al. (2009), I also estimate eq. (2) with fixed-industry effect and 
with standard errors clustered in the two dimensions of firm and year (Petersen, 2009) 
and the results are reported in Table 5. The results for the main experimental 
variables are generally consistent with those in Table 4 and support my hypotheses. 
Most of the coefficient estimates on information asymmetry variables, interactions, 
and the joint tests are significant with the predicted signs. Although the joint test is 
not significant at conventional levels when Error is used as the proxy of information 
asymmetry, the sign is consistent with my prediction. The results for the control 
variables are also consistent with those reported in previous studies (e.g., Biddle et al., 
2009). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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In summary, the results in Table 4 and Table 5 provide strong evidence supporting 
my hypothesis of H1a, that when firms are more prone to under-invest, lower 
information asymmetry increases investments, and of H1b, that when firms are more 
prone to over-invest, lower information asymmetry decreases investments.  
5.2 Firms that deviate from the predicted investment levels 
In this section, I use an alternative way to identify whether a firm is over- investing or 
under-investing. Regression eq. (1) is run and a firm is defined as over-investing if 
the residual is positive and under-investing if the residual is negative. As described in 
section 4.1, the dummy variables Pos is coded one for over-investing firms and zero 
for other firms and the dummy variable Neg is coded one for under-investing firms 
and zero for other firms. Then the effects of lower asymmetric information on 
investments are tested separately for over- and under-investing firms using regression 
eq. (3). The results are reported in Table 6, with Disp and Error as proxies of 
asymmetric information.  
 
Columns (1) and (2) present the univariate regression results. As predicted, the 
coefficients on Disp× Neg and Error× Neg are significantly positive, while those on 
Disp× Pos and Error× Pos are significantly negative. I include all the control 
variables used earlier except for accounting quality in columns (3) and (4) and the 
results are still consistent with my hypotheses that lower information asymmetry is 
negatively associated with under-investment and over-investment, i.e., lower 
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information asymmetry is positively associated with investment for under-investing 




Columns (5) and (6) show the regression results of how asymmetric information 
influences firms’ over- and under-investment, after controlling for AQ and other firm-
specific variables. The estimated coefficients on the main experimental variables, the 
interaction term of information asymmetry and over-investment and under-investment, 
remain significant with their predicted signs. In terms of the economic significance, 
for column (5) (or column (6)), a one-standard-deviation increase in Disp (or Error) 
on average increases investment by approximately 0.007 (or 0.005)
16
 for under-
investing firms and decreases investment by approximately 0.008 (or 0.01)
17
 for over-
investing firms. Given that the mean investment is 0.161 (See Table 2), such effects 
imply that investments increase by 4.3% (or 3.1%)
18
 for under-investing firms and 
decrease by 5.0% (or 6.2%)
19
 for over-investing firms. Hence, the effects of 
information asymmetry on investment efficiency are economically as well as 
statistically significant. Therefore, consistent with my hypotheses, the under-investing 
firms with lower asymmetric information tend to increase investments while the over-
investing firms with lower asymmetric information tend to reduce investments.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 7 shows the regression results of the models specified in eq. (3) when forecast 
                                                          
15
 In untabulated analysis, I test the relation between reporting quality, AQ, and investment efficiency 
(Biddle et al., 2009) without information asymmetry included. The results show that, consistent with 
the prior literature, AQ is negatively associated with investment for over-investing firms and positively 
associated with investment for under-investing firms.   
16
 These figures are calculated as 0.394×0.019 (or 0.091×0.053). 
17
 These figures are calculated as 0.413×0.019 (or 0.190×0.053). 
18
 These figures are calculated as 0.007/0.161 (or 0.005/0.161). 
19
 These figures are calculated as 0.008/0.161 (or 0.010/0.161). 
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dispersion and error are replaced by a stock return volatility measure, Std, and a 
yearly high-low price spread, Spread. The estimated coefficients on Std× Neg and 
Spread× Neg are positive and significant while those on Std× Pos and Spread× Pos are 
negative and significant. The results are consistent with those reported when using 
Disp and Error as the measures of information asymmetry (See Table 6). For 
example, the coefficient on the interaction term of Std and under-investment dummy 
is significantly positive (2.338, p=0.000) and the coefficient on the interaction term of 
Std and over-investment dummy is significantly negative (-1.479, p=0.000) in column 
(5). Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction term of Spread and under-investment 
dummy is significantly positive (4.375, p=0.000) and the coefficient on the 
interaction term of Spread and over-investment dummy is significantly negative (-
3.262, p=0.000) in column (6). In terms of the economic significance, for column (5) 
(or column (6)), a one-standard-deviation increase in Std (or Spread) on average 
increases investment by approximately 0.033 (or 0.026)
20
 for under-investing firms 
and decreases investment by approximately 0.021 (or 0.020) for over-investing firms. 
Given that the mean investment is 0.161, as shown in Table 2, such effects imply that 
investments increase by 20.5% (or 16.1%)
21
 for under-investing firms and decrease 
by 13% (or 12.4%) for over-investing firms. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
As a further test, I drop the observations with the residuals estimated from eq. (1) that 
are lower than the median of the positive residuals and are higher than the median of 
the negative residuals. For the remaining observations, the dummy variable, pos, is 
coded one if the residual is positive and otherwise coded zero. Similarly, the dummy 
                                                          
20
 These figures are calculated as 2.338×0.014 (or 4.375×0.006). 
21
 These figures are calculated as 0.033/0.161 (or 0.026/0.161). 
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variable, neg, is coded one if the residual is negative and otherwise coded zero. This 
procedure gives me a sample of firms with more severe over- or under-investment; 
the number of observations is thus reduced by 50%. Table 8 presents the results of the 
regression eq. (3) using the reduced sample. When I use Disp, Error, Std and Spread 
as proxies of information asymmetry, the coefficients on Disp× Neg, Error× Neg, 
Std× Neg and Spread× Neg are always significantly positive and the coefficients on 
Disp× Pos, Error× Pos, Std× Pos and Spread× Pos are always significantly negative. 
As I only include the observations in the upper half of the positive residuals and 
lower half of the negative residuals, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on 
the interaction terms are consistently higher than their counterparts in Table 6 and 
Table 7. The Table 8 results provide corroborative support for my hypotheses that 
lower information asymmetry is positively associated with investment for under-
investing firms and is negatively associated with investment for over-investing firms. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
5.3.1 Instrumental variables estimation 
As the level of information asymmetry of a firm and the firm’s investment decisions 
can be endogenously determined by firms rather than exogenously given, the above 
analysis is subject to endogeneity problems. If a firm’s information asymmetry and 
investment decisions are driven by the same underlying forces or common omitted 
factors simultaneously, my models and analyses may create a spurious relation 
between information asymmetry and investment efficiency. For example, the 
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managers of under-investing firms in anticipation of future investment opportunities 
might want to improve the current information environment, and thereby reduce 
information asymmetry. This will lower the cost of external finance and help fund 
incremental investments. Under this situation, the underlying driving force of the 
association between information asymmetry and investment decisions is the 
managers’ perceptions of future investment and financing needs. To address the 
potential endogeneity of information asymmetry and investment efficiency, I use 
instrumental variables estimation and use the industry average information 
asymmetry for each firm as instrument for the firm’s information asymmetry. For 
example, I use the industry average analyst forecast dispersion and error as 
instruments for each firm’s forecast dispersion and error, respectively. Information 
asymmetry at the firm level is influenced by that of its industry peers since firms in 
the same industry tend to share commonalities in the factors that affect information 
asymmetry. However, the industry average dispersion and error are unlikely to be 
closely related with the investment behaviors of a particular firm. Hence, the industry 
average forecast dispersion (error) can make a good instrumental variable for the 
forecast dispersion (error) of a specific firm.  
 
The firm-level information asymmetry is estimated as a function of the instrumental 
variable as well as all of the control variables and the predicted value of information 
asymmetry is then included in the main models to replace the original information 
asymmetry variable. The fixed-effect regressions of eq. (3) are re-estimated in the 
second stage of the model and the results are shown in Table 9. The untabulated 
results from the first-stage instrumental model show that the industry average Disp, 
Error, Std and Spread are positively and significantly associated with the firms’ Disp, 
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Error, Std and Spread, respectively. The F-tests in the first-stage regressions indicate 
that the coefficient estimates on the instruments are significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level. Using firms’ proneness to over- or under-invest as the measure of 
investment efficiency, Table 9 shows consistent results with those presented in Table 
4. The estimated coefficients on the main experimental variables are all highly 
significant with p-values close to zero and with predicted signs, except for the joint 
test with Error in column (2). The restraints of lower information asymmetry on 
firms’ proneness to over- or under-invest still survive when using instrumental 
variables estimation. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
Table 10 shows the instrumental variables estimation results when investment 
efficiency is based on deviations from the predicted investment levels. The coefficient 
estimates on the interaction terms of information asymmetry and under-investment 
dummy are always positive and significant at the 1% level and those on the 
interaction terms of information asymmetry and over-investment dummy are negative 
and significant at the 1% level except when forecast error is used as the proxy of 
information asymmetry. Therefore, my findings on the impact of information 
asymmetry on over- and under-investment appear to be robust to the instrumental 
variables estimation.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
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5.3.2 Alternative measures of investments 
As a robustness check, I replace the investment dependent variable (Invest) for each 
firm in eq. (3) by alternative measures of investment and re-estimate my main models. 
The alternatives are the capital investment, Capex, and the residual of the regression 
model specified by eq. (1), which measures the deviation from the predicted 
investment. The regression results of eq.(2) with Capex as the dependent variable are 
shown in Table 11 and those of eq.(3) with Capex and the residual as dependent 
variables are shown, respectively, in Panel A and Panel B of Table 12.  Overall, my 
conclusions are not affected by the decision to use capital investment or the 
investment model residual instead of investment as the dependent variable.  













Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Theoretical models have suggested that lower information asymmetry can improve 
firms’ investment efficiency by mitigating the adverse selection problem and moral 
hazard or principal-agent conflict. Extending previous research, I use the dispersion 
and error of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the volatilities of daily stock returns and 
yearly high-low price spreads as the proxies of information asymmetry and test the 
relations between information asymmetry and investment efficiency. My study is the 
first to directly investigate this relation with a variety of proxies of information 
asymmetry and two different approaches to measure investment efficiency.  
 
I find that lower information asymmetry is positively associated with investment for 
firms classified as under-investing and the firms that are more likely to under-invest, 
and is negatively associated with investment for firms classified as over-investing and 
the firms that are more likely to over-invest. The results are robust across different 
regression methodologies and to different estimates of the variables. Overall, the 
findings are consistent with my hypotheses that lower information asymmetry 
restrains firms’ incentives to under-invest and over-invest and firms with lower 
information asymmetry deviate less from the optimal investment levels predicted by 








Table 1 Definitions of variables 
 
This table provides detailed definitions of variables. The item numbers of the 
variables from Compustat are provided.  
 
Name  Definition 
Invest The sum of research and development expenditure (item 46), capital 
expenditure (item 128), and acquisition expenditure (item 129) less cash 
receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment (item 107) and 
scaled by lagged total assets (item 6). 
Capex The ratio of capital expenditure (item 128) to lagged property, plant and 
equipment (item 8). 
Disp The standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by fiscal 
year end price and then multiplied by minus one. 
Error The absolute earnings forecast error: |actual EPS-median forecast EPS| 
scaled by fiscal year end price and then multiplied by minus one. 
Std The standard deviation of the residuals of the market model regression, 
where the daily stock returns of a firm is regressed against the value-
weighted market returns from CRSP and then multiplied by minus one. 
The estimation period is one year. 
Spread The yearly high-low price spreads based on daily high-low price data 
from CRSP following the methodology in Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
and then multiplied by minus one. 
Q The ratio of Market value of total assets to Book value of total assets= 
[book value of assets (item 6) + market value of common stock (item 
25 item 199) - book value of common stock (item 60) - balance sheet 
deferred taxes (item 74)]/book value of assets (item 6). 
AQ Financial reporting quality is calculated as the standard deviation of the 
firm-level residuals from the model developed by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and extended by Francis et al. (2005) to include change in 
revenues and plant, property and equipment (PPE) during the years t-5 
to t-1 and multiplied by negative one so that AQ is increasing in 
financial reporting quality. The extended Dechow and Dichev model is a 
regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future 
cash flows plus the change in revenue and PPE and is estimated cross-
sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given 
year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification. 
OverInvest In each year and industry, firms are ranked into deciles based on each of 
the two firm-specific variables, cash balance and leverage (leverage is 
multiplied by minus one before ranking). The two groups of ranked 
numbers are rescaled to range between zero and one, respectively. 





















Age The difference between the first date when a firm appeared in CRSP and 
the fiscal year end date.  
Size The logarithm of total assets (item 6). 
MB The ratio of the market value of equity (item 25 item 199) to the book 
value of common stock (item 60). 
Cash The ratio of cash (item 1) to total assets (item 6). 
Leverage The ratio of debt to total assets= [long-term debt (item 9) + debt in 
current liabilities (item 34)]/ total assets (item 6). 
Sdcfo The standard deviation of the cash flow from operations deflated by the 
average total assets from years t-5 to t-1. 
Sdsales The standard deviation of the sales (item 12) deflated by the average 
total assets from years t-5 to t-1.  
Sdinvest The standard deviation of investment (Invest) from years t-5 to t-1.  
Loss An indicator variable that takes the value of one if net income before 
extraordinary items (item 18) is negative, and zero otherwise.  
Dividend An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm paid a 
dividend (i.e., if item 21>0 or item 127>0), and zero otherwise.  
Zscore A measure of a firm’s financial health= [3.3×pretax income + sales + 
0.25×retained earnings + 0.5× (current assets-current  liabilities)]/total 
assets = [3.3× item 170 + item 12 + 0.25× item 36 + 0.5× (items 4-item 
5)]/item 6. 
Tangible The ratio of tangible assets (item 8) to total assets (item 6). 
OC The average time between purchasing or acquiring inventory and 
receiving the cash proceeds from its sale = Log [(item 2/item 12+item 
3/item 41) 360]. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis, including 
the mean, standard deviation (STD), 25% percentile, median and 75% percentile. The 
sample includes 12,871 firm-year observations during the period from 1993 to 2009. 
Investt+1 is investment at time t+1. The dispersion of analysts' forecasts (Disp), 
forecast error (Error), the volatility of daily stock returns (Std) and yearly high-low 
price spreads (Spread) have been multiplied by minus one. Detailed definitions of 
variables are reported in Table 1.  
 
Variables   Mean STD 25%  Median 75% 
Invest t+1  0.161 0.211  0.058  0.110  0.199 
Dispt –0.006 0.019 –0.004 –0.002 –0.001 
Errort –0.011 0.053 –0.007 –0.002 –0.001 
OverInvestt 0.495 0.232 0.333 0.500 0.667 
Aget  18.480 17.286  6.471 12.249 24.888 
Sizet  6.913 1.694  5.648  6.768  8.036 
MBt  3.089 3.187  1.497  2.333  3.683 
Casht  0.161 0.181  0.026  0.088  0.237 
Leveraget  0.216 0.182  0.047  0.200  0.333 
Sdcfot  0.081 0.075  0.035  0.058  0.099 
Sdsalest  0.167 0.147  0.070  0.123  0.214 
Sdinvestt  0.128 0.179  0.033  0.069  0.149 
Losst  0.230 0.421  0  0  0 
Dividendt  0.456 0.498  0  0  1 
Zscoret  1.359 1.007  0.788  1.357  1.942 
Tangiblet  0.316 0.237  0.121  0.250  0.474 
OCt  4.619 0.700  4.252  4.693  5.086 
Stdt –0.028 0.014 –0.035 –0.025 –0.018 
Spreadt –0.004 0.006 –0.005 –0.002  0.000 
AQt –0.105 0.122 –0.122 –0.059 –0.032 
Qt  2.048 1.546  1.196  1.596  2.327 
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Table 3 Correlation matrices of variables 
 
This table presents Pearson correlations of the variables in the analysis. Investt+1 is investment at time t+1. Detailed definitions of 
variables are reported in Table 1. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 Investt+1 Disp Error Std Spread Size Age MB Cash Leverage Sdcfo Sdsales Sdinvest Loss Dividend Zscore Tangible OC AQ 
Dispt 0.04
***













































































































          




































































































































































































































































Table 4 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ proneness to over- and under-invest—Firm-year fixed effect model 
 
This table presents fixed-effect regression results of eq.(2) specified as follows: 
Investi,t+1 = α0 + α1Dispi,t + α2Dispi,t× OverInvesti,t + α3OverInvesti,t + α4AQi,t + 
α5AQi,t× OverInvesti,t + γControli,t +λi + εi,t+1, where Investi,t+1 refers to the 
investment of firm i in year t+1, OverInvest is a ranked variable based on cash and 
leverage to measure a firm’s proneness to under- or over-invest. Disp, Error, Std and 
Spread are four proxies of asymmetric information. The joint test is a test of whether 
the addition of the coefficient on information asymmetry and the coefficient on the 
interaction of information asymmetry and OverInvest is statistically negative. The 
numbers in brackets are the p-values. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in 
Table 1. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Disp  Error  Std  Spread  
Disp   1.684
***
    
 [0.000]    
DispｘOverInvest –2.935
***
    
 [0.000]    
Error    0.254
***
   
  [0.000]   
ErrorｘOverInvest  –0.465
***
   
  [0.009]   
Std     4.649
***
  
   [0.000]  
StdｘOverInvest   –7.057
***
  
   [0.000]  
Spread      6.847
***
 
    [0.000] 
SpreadｘOverInvest    –10.005
***
 
    [0.000] 
OverInvest  –0.368*** –0.352*** –0.431*** –0.374*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Joint significance test –1.250*** –0.211* –2.409*** –3.158*** 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AQｘOverInvest –0.762
***
 –0.789*** –0.429*** –0.767*** 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Size –0.089*** –0.090*** –0.086*** –0.092*** 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sdcfo –0.097** –0.103*** –0.069* –0.096** 
 [0.017] [0.009] [0.085] [0.023] 
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Sdsales –0.009 –0.010 –0.013 –0.012 
 [0.629] [0.593] [0.496] [0.543] 
Sdinvest –0.083*** –0.078*** –0.066*** –0.088*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Loss –0.022*** –0.026*** –0.013** –0.026*** 




















 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tangible  –0.068** –0.074*** –0.004 –0.072** 
 [0.012] [0.004] [0.883] [0.012] 
OC –0.010 –0.007 –0.004 –0.011 
 [0.180] [0.327] [0.560] [0.150] 









 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 12,871 12,630 12,870 11,660 
Number of firms 3,576 3,548 3,575 3,200 
R
2

































Table 5 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ proneness to over- and under-invest-- Two-dimensional Cluster model 
 
This table presents regression results of eq. (2) specified as follows: Investi,t+1 = α0 + 
α1Dispi,t + α2Dispi,t× OverInvesti,t + α3OverInvesti,t + α4AQi,t + α5AQi,t× OverInvesti,t 
+ γControli,t +λi + εi,t+1 with fixed-industry effect and with standard errors clustered 
in firm and year dimensions (proposed by Petersen (2009)). Investi,t+1 refers to the 
investment of firm i in year t+1, OverInvest is a ranked variable based on cash and 
leverage to measure a firm’s proneness to under- or over-invest. Disp, Error, Std and 
Spread are four proxies of asymmetric information. The joint test is a test of whether 
the addition of the coefficient on information asymmetry and the coefficient on the 
interaction of information asymmetry and OverInvest is statistically negative. The 
numbers in brackets are the p-values. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in 
Table 1. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Disp Error Std Spread 
Disp 1.095
**
    
 [0.014]    
DispｘOverInvest -1.796
**
    
 [0.035]    
Error  0.286
**
   
  [0.036]   
ErrorｘOverInvest  -0.470
*
   
  [0.069]   
Std   5.200
***
  
   [0.000]  
StdｘOverInvest   -8.614
***
  
   [0.000]  
Spread    8.030
***
 
    [0.000] 
SpreadｘOverInvest    -11.337
***
 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 











































































































 [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] 
Sdinvest 0.014 0.017 0.032
**
 0.016 




















 [0.090] [0.053] [0.005] [0.035] 
Zscore -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 






























 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 12,871 12,630 12,870 11,660 
Number of firms 3,576 3,548 3,575 3,200 
R
2
 0.147 0.153 0.182 0.156 
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Table 6 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ deviations from the predicted investment levels 
 
This table presents the results of the fixed-effect regression model of eq.(3), specified 
as follows: Investi,t+1 = α0 + β1Dispi,t× negi,t+1 + β2Dispi,t× posi,t+1 + γControli,t +λi + 
εi,t+1, where the investment of firm i in year t+1, Investi,t+1, is explained by the 
interaction term of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the under-investment dummy, 
Dispi,t× negi,t+1, the interaction term of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the over-
investment dummy, Dispi,t× posi,t+1, and control variables. In columns (2), (4) and (6), 
median analyst forecast error, Error, is used as the proxy of information asymmetry. 
The numbers in brackets are the p-values. Detailed definitions of variables are 
reported in Table 1. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** 
and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Disp Error Disp Error Disp  Error  
Dispｘneg  1.249***  0.671***   0.394***  
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Dispｘpos –1.008***  -1.285***  –0.413**  
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.029]  
Errorｘneg   0.251***  0.142***   0.091*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.006] 
Errorｘpos  –0.635***  -0.733***  –0.190* 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.087] 
AQｘneg       0.175***  0.177*** 
      [0.000] [0.000] 
AQｘpos      –0.439*** –0.440*** 
      [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 




 –0.061*** –0.064*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 




 –0.188*** –0.180*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 




 –0.132*** –0.129*** 
   [0.026] [0.020] [0.001] [0.001] 
Sdsales   -0.026 -0.028 –0.016 –0.019 
   [0.190] [0.133] [0.393] [0.301] 




 –0.045*** –0.040*** 
   [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.004] 




 –0.024*** –0.026*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.004] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tangible    0.048 0.046 0.037 0.037 
   [0.103] [0.105] [0.189] [0.172] 
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   [0.089] [0.042] [0.065] [0.029] 













 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 12,871 12,630 12,871 12,871 12,871 12,630 
Number of firms 3,576 3,548 3,576 3,576 3,576 3,548 
R
2













































Table 7 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ deviations from the predicted investment levels - Alternative proxies of 
information asymmetry 
 
This table presents the fixed-effect results of the regressions on the effect of 
information asymmetry on investment efficiency when information asymmetry is 
measured by Std and Spread, which are respectively the standard deviation of daily 
stock return residuals and the average of daily high-low price spreads. Columns (1), 
(3) and (5) show the results of regression model specified as follows: Investi,t+1 = α0 
+ β1Stdi,t× negi,t+1 + β2Stdi,t× posi,t+1 + γControli,t +λi + εi,t+1. In columns (2), (4) and 
(6), Std is replaced by Spread. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in Table 
1. P-values are reported in brackets. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Std Spread Std Spread Std Spread 
Stdｘneg 3.153***  2.612***  2.338***  
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Stdｘpos -1.985***  -1.898***  -1.479***  
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Spreadｘneg  7.052***  6.298***  4.375*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Spreadｘpos  -7.465***  -6.103***  -3.262*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
AQｘneg     0.067*** 0.156*** 
     [0.004] [0.000] 
AQｘpos     -0.163*** -0.427*** 
     [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.039] [0.029] [0.016] [0.002] 
Sdsales   -0.016 -0.023 -0.013 -0.011 
   [0.403] [0.254] [0.480] [0.563] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









   [0.012] [0.000] [0.009] [0.000] 









   [0.020] [0.045] [0.014] [0.015] 









   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tangible   0.019 0.020 0.020 0.012 
   [0.496] [0.508] [0.465] [0.695] 
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OC   0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 














 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 12,870 11,660 12,870 11,660 12,870 11,660 
Number of firms 3,575 3,200 3,575 3,200 3,575 3,200 
















Table 8 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ deviations from the predicted investment levels – Alternative measure of 
pos and neg  
 
This table presents the results of the firm-year fixed effect regression model of eq.(3), 
specified as follows: Investi,t+1 = α0 + β1Dispi,t× negi,t+1 + β2Dispi,t× posi,t+1 + 
γControli,t +λi + εi,t+1, where the investment of firm i in year t+1, Investi,t+1, is 
explained by the interaction term of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the under-
investment dummy, Dispi,t× negi,t+1, the interaction term of dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts and the over-investment dummy, Dispi,t× posi,t+1, and control variables. The 
dummy variables, Pos and Neg, are defined based on the regression residuals of eq. 
(1). I drop the observations if the residual is lower than the median of the positive residuals 
and is higher than the median of the negative residuals. For the remaining observations, if the 
residual is positive, the dummy variable, pos, is coded one and otherwise coded zero. 
Similarly, the dummy variable, neg, is coded one for the observations with negative residuals 
and otherwise coded zero. Disp, Error, Std and Spread are four proxies of information 
asymmetry. The numbers in brackets are the p-values. Detailed definitions of 
variables are reported in Table 1. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Disp Error Std Spread 
Dispｘneg 1.294
***
    
 [0.000]    
Dispｘpos -2.858
***
    
 [0.000]    
Errorｘneg  0.138
**
   
  [0.046]   
Errorｘpos  -0.695
***
   
  [0.004]   
Stdｘneg   3.462
***
  
   [0.000]  
Stdｘpos   -4.016
***
  
   [0.000]  
Spreadｘneg    5.713
***
 
    [0.000] 
Spreadｘpos    -6.976
***
 















































































 [0.024] [0.015] [0.072] [0.061] 
Sdsales -0.020 -0.019 -0.035 -0.001 






































 [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.005] 
Tangible  0.086 0.074 0.062 0.051 
 [0.147] [0.183] [0.267] [0.418] 
OC 0.010 0.014 -0.004 0.001 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 6,436 6,331 6,435 5,768 
Number of firms 2,659 2,642 2,658 2,377 
R
2




Table 9 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ proneness to over- and under-invest -- Instrumental variables estimation 
 
This table presents the results of the second-stage regression of the instrumental 
variables estimations of eq. (2), where the four proxies of firm-level information 
asymmetry are instrumented by their industry average level in each year, respectively. 
In the first stage, the firm-level Disp, Error, Std, and Spread are regressed on industry 
average Disp, Error, Std, and Spread, respectively, and other control variables. In the 
second stage, the predicted information asymmetry is used to explain investment with 
fixed-effect regression. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in Table 1. P-
values are reported in brackets. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Disp Error Std Spread 
Disp 9.537
***
    
 [0.000]    
DispｘOverInvest -15.809
***
    
 [0.000]    
Error  1.268
***
   
  [0.000]   
ErrorｘOverInvest  -1.833
***
   
  [0.008]   
Std   6.716
***
  
   [0.000]  
StdｘOverInvest   -10.039
***
  
   [0.000]  
Spread    33.959
***
 
    [0.000] 
SpreadｘOverInvest    -49.370
***
 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 

































































 [0.098] [0.011] [0.189] [0.031] 
Sdsales -0.012 -0.011 -0.014 -0.033 





































 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tangible  -0.029 -0.063
**
 0.027 -0.025 





 -0.003 -0.010 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 12,871 12,630 12,870 11,660 






































Table 10 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ deviations from the predicted investment levels -- Instrumental variables 
estimation 
 
This table presents the results of the second-stage regression of the instrumental 
variables estimations of eq. (3), where the four proxies of firm-level information 
asymmetry are instrumented by their industry average level in each year, respectively. 
In the first stage, the firm-level Disp, Error, Std, and Spread are regressed on industry 
average Disp, Error, Std, and Spread, respectively, and other control variables. In the 
second stage, the predicted information asymmetry is used to explain investment with 
fixed-effect regression. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in Table 1. P-
values are reported in brackets. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Disp  Error  Std  Spread  
Dispｘneg  3.999
***
    
 [0.000]    
Dispｘpos  –3.460
***
    
 [0.000]    
Errorｘneg    0.720
***
   
  [0.000]   
Errorｘpos   –0.654   
  [0.156]   
Stdｘneg     3.883
***
  
   [0.000]  
Stdｘpos    –0.763
***
  
   [0.008]  
Spreadｘneg       21.020
***
 
    [0.000] 
Spreadｘpos     –8.412
***
 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.015] [0.048] 
AQｘpos –0.330
***
 –0.414*** –0.080*** –0.244*** 










 [0.013] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] 
Size –0.053*** –0.065*** –0.058*** –0.068*** 




















 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Leverage –0.162*** –0.167*** –0.128*** –0.134*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sdcfo –0.101** –0.113*** –0.066* –0.102** 


































Sdsales –0.029 –0.024 –0.009 –0.025 
 [0.164] [0.192] [0.643] [0.248] 
Sdinvest –0.045*** –0.039*** –0.045*** –0.069*** 
 [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.000] 
Loss –0.004 –0.019*** –0.007 –0.017*** 




















 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] 
Tangible  0.061
**
 0.041 0.021 0.013 
 [0.049] [0.138] [0.448] [0.679] 
OC 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.001 
 [0.322] [0.140] [0.554] [0.893] 









 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 12,871 12,630 12,870 11,660 
Number of firms 3,576 3,648 3,575 3,200 
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Table 11 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ proneness to over- and under-invest -- Robustness tests with alternative 
measures of investments 
 
This table presents the results of the robustness tests of eq. (2) with alternative 
dependent variables. The dependent variable is the capital investment (Capext+1) of 
firm i at time t+1, measured as the ratio of capital expenditure to total fixed assets. 
OverInvest is a ranked variable based on cash and leverage to measure a firm’s 
proneness to under- or over-invest. Disp, Error, Std and Spread are four proxies of 
asymmetric information. The joint test is a test of whether the addition of the 
coefficient on information asymmetry and the coefficient on the interaction of 
information asymmetry and OverInvest is statistically negative. The numbers in 
brackets are the p-values. Detailed definitions of variables are reported in Table 1. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Disp Error Std Spread 
Disp 1.055
***
    
 [0.000]    
DispｘOverInvest -2.018
***
    
 [0.000]    
Error  0.132
**
   
  [0.041]   
ErrorｘOverInvest  -0.254   
  [0.119]   
Std   3.211
***
  
   [0.000]  
StdｘOverInvest   -5.130
***
  
   [0.000]  
Spread    5.211
***
 
    [0.000] 
SpreadｘOverInvest    -8.503
***
 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 























































 [0.069] [0.258] [0.099] [0.012] 
Sdcfo -0.007 -0.007 0.010 0.002 
 [0.852] [0.848] [0.794] [0.967] 
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Sdsales -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.019 






































 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tangible  -0.024 -0.030 0.021 -0.024 




















 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 12,733 12,494 12,732 11,532 
Number of firms 3,555 3,526 3,554 3,179 
R
2
































Table 12 The effect of information asymmetry on investment efficiency based on 
firms’ deviations from the predicted investment levels --Robustness tests with 
alternative measures of investments 
 
This table presents the results of the robustness tests on the effect of information 
asymmetry on investment efficiency with alternative dependent variables. In panel A, 
the dependent variable is the capital investment (Capext+1) of firm i at time t+1, 
measured as the ratio of capital expenditure to total fixed assets. In panel B, The 
dependent variable is the residuals of eq. (1) specified as: Investi,t+1=α + βQi,t + εi,t+1, 
where Qi,t measures the investment opportunities of a firm. This regression is 
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given 
year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification. Detailed 
definitions of variables are reported in Table 1. P-Values are reported in brackets. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: use capital investment as the dependent variable 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Disp  Error  Std  Spread  
Dispｘneg  0.781
***
    
 [0.000]    
Dispｘpos –0.304
*
    
 [0.073]    
Errorｘneg   0.137
***
   
  [0.000]   
Errorｘpos  –0.166   
  [0.158]   
Stdｘneg    2.750
***
  
   [0.000]  
Stdｘpos   –3.636
***
  
   [0.000]  
spreadｘneg     6.661
***
 
    [0.000] 
spreadｘpos    –6.186
***
 





 0.034  0.155
***
 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.105] [0.000] 
AQｘpos –0.940
***
 –0.949*** –0.340*** –0.823*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Size –0.067*** –0.066*** –0.061*** –0.068*** 




















 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Leverage –0.116*** –0.115*** –0.082*** –0.113*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 56 
Sdcfo –0.127*** –0.121*** –0.054 –0.104** 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.140] [0.011] 
Sdsales 0.002 0.003 –0.003 –0.001 
 [0.928] [0.872] [0.842] [0.975] 
Sdinvest 0.007 0.008 0.017 0.005 
 [0.603] [0.597] [0.192] [0.728] 
Loss –0.025*** –0.027*** –0.017*** –0.026*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] 
Dividend –0.003 –0.003 –0.008 –0.001 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tangible  –0.637*** –0.635*** –0.518*** –0.632*** 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 









 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Number of observations 12,733 12,494 12,732 11,532 
Number of firms 3,555 3,526 3,554 3,179 
R
2































Panel B: use the deviation from predicted investment level as the dependent variable 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Disp  Error  Std  Spread  
Dispｘneg 0.503
**
    
 [0.030]    
Dispｘpos –1.205
***
    
 [0.003]    
Errorｘneg  0.099   
   [0.179]   
Errorｘpos  –0.640
**
   
   [0.010]   
Stdｘneg    3.119
***
  
   [0.000]  
Stdｘpos   –5.303
***
  
   [0.000]  
spreadｘneg     5.472
***
 
    [0.000] 
spreadｘpos    –10.894
***
 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
AQｘpos –0.879
***
 –0.888*** –0.308*** –0.829*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.226] [0.193] [0.477] [0.236] 
Size –0.013 –0.017** 0.001 –0.014 
 [0.109] [0.036] [0.882] [0.107] 
MB –0.011*** –0.011*** –0.010*** –0.009*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Cash 0.092
*
 0.074 0.076 0.064 
 [0.060] [0.125] [0.110] [0.196] 





 [0.431] [0.479] [0.010] [0.077] 
Sdcfo –0.020 –0.012 0.027 0.026 
 [0.814] [0.890] [0.746] [0.764] 
Sdsales 0.013 0.009 0.011 –0.019 
 [0.759] [0.834] [0.782] [0.650] 
Sdinvest –0.014 –0.010 –0.033 –0.016 
 [0.640] [0.733] [0.255] [0.617] 
Loss –0.011 –0.014 0.002 –0.005 
 [0.386] [0.246] [0.879] [0.679] 
Dividend 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.015 










 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] 
Tangible  –0.026 –0.021 –0.071 –0.063 











 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Intercept  –0.226** –0.208** –0.259** –0.215** 
 [0.032] [0.047] [0.012] [0.047] 
Number of observations 12,871 12,630 12,870 11,660 
Number of firms 3,576 3,548 3,575 3,200 
R
2
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